NOTE. Data were abstracted from available clinic notes. Median duration of symptoms before seeking medical care for 16 patients, 2 days; range, 1-3 days. Median temperature at initial medical examination for 17 patients, 39؇C; range, 37.06؇C-39.94؇C.
B R I E F R E P O R T
From 18 June through 10 July 2005, a single platoon of 38 Marines located in western Iraq experienced 22 cases of febrile respiratory illness. The high number of cases was reported by the unit physician (G.T.) to the Navy Forward Deployed Preventive Medicine Unit, which dispatched a team to assist in the disease investigation. Cases were identified by reviewing the unit sick-call log; available medical records were reviewed, and relevant data were abstracted. All patients were male, with a mean age of 24 years (range, 20-33 years), reflecting the Marine Reserve population from which the patients came. The clinical presentation was characterized by rapid onset of fever and chills (in 100% of patients), headache (76%), as well as mild respiratory (76%) and gastrointestinal (53%) symptoms. Fifty percent of patients experienced both gastrointestinal and respiratory symptoms (table 1) . All initial diagnoses were based on medical history and physical examination findings, because limited clinical laboratory support and no radiographic support were available. Early in the outbreak, patients received the diagnosis of upper respiratory infection, and patients affected later in the outbreak received the diagnosis of atypical pneumonia.
The 38-man platoon was part of a larger US Marine unit on a base with a population of 450-600 personnel during the outbreak period. No similar illnesses were reported outside this single platoon, despite similar opportunities for other personnel to have similar exposures before the outbreak. The epidemic curve is presented in figure 1 . There was a 4-day lull in cases that corresponded to the start of a major offensive operation conducted by all Marines of the base, from 28 June through 7 July 2005 [1] . During that time, it is likely that individuals from the platoon were sick but, to be able to support the operation, did not present for medical attention. The 22 patients had a median of 2 sick-in-quarters days and 1 day of light duty. Marine infantrymen on light duty are unable to perform their primary duty, so the 20 light-duty and 44 sick-in-quarters days attributable to this outbreak resulted in a total of 64 lost duty days (figure 1).
Methods. The request for investigative assistance was received on 3 July and emphasized the respiratory nature of the symptoms. Therefore, the initial focus of the investigation was on common respiratory pathogens. The investigation team arrived at the base on 5 July, where, because of the operational tempo of the concurrent major offensive, only 5 patients were available for interview and collection of throat swab culture samples. We were unable to interview any unaffected persons at that time. Throat swab samples were collected in ethanol [2] to test for influenza (types A and B), adenovirus (types 4 and 7), respiratory syncytial virus (types 1 and 2), Chlamydia pneumoniae, and Mycoplasma pneumoniae by use of real-time nucleic acid amplification in our field laboratory. Initial results for selected respiratory pathogens were negative.
Follow-up serological testing was arranged 6 weeks after outbreak onset; 9 patients and 10 unaffected persons completed questionnaires about arboviral risk factors and donated serum for testing at Navy Medical Research Unit 3 (Cairo, Egypt). For all samples, results of arboviral antibody testing for West Nile virus, sand fly fever (Naples type), sand fly fever (Sicilian type), and Rift Valley fever were negative. Samples were positive (11:50) for Q fever IgM (phase II) for all 9 tested patients and were negative (!1:16) for all 10 tested unaffected persons.
At the time of the outbreak, an environmental assessment of the base and the berthing area of the affected platoon revealed several possible risk factors for Q fever. Traditional risk factors for Q fever are dust and exposure to livestock. Wind is nearly constant and dust is prevalent in the area; the local civilian population regularly keeps goats and sheep; and feral dogs are commonly present in and around the base. In this case, all personnel were exposed to dust, and nearly all were exposed to livestock.
On confirmation of the etiologic agent, follow-up questionnaires designed to elucidate the extent of the Q fever outbreak and to identify potential risk factors were distributed and completed by 132 (97%) of the 136 personnel of the company that included the affected platoon (table 2) . Of the 132 individuals who completed the survey, 109 (82.6%) also had pre-and postdeployment serum samples available for analysis. A trend toward an association was found for patients to have had exposure to camels and to the birth of both sheep and dogs. For a short time before and during this outbreak, several puppies were being kept by Marines on the base, although not by the affected platoon. Marines on foot patrol sometimes temporarily occupy various sites, including abandoned structures or barns where animals have lived and given birth. Additionally, an association was found between confirmed Q fever infection and tick bites. Ticks are known reservoirs of Q fever, with transstadial and transovarial transmission among ticks participating in wildlife Q fever cycles [3] . Tick exposure may be associated with foot patrols through rural or wooded areas, although we did not ask questions that allow evaluation of this possibility. Interestingly, when the initial small group of case patients and control individuals were surveyed about arboviral risk factors, the use of DEET on exposed skin tended to be protective (OR, 0.14; 95% CI, 0.01-1.61). Exposure to dogs or other animals may confound the presence of tick bites; however, we found no evidence of this in our limited data. There is no available evidence that ticks are a prevalent problem among US personnel in Iraq, although available surveillance systems are not specifically designed to track insect bites and may not be sensitive to the issue. Finally, there is recall bias associated with a ret- NOTE. All personnel were exposed to dust. While on patrol, Marines may have temporarily occupied abandoned buildings where animals lived or gave birth. Totals for each exposure are not equal because "unsure" responses were not included in this analysis.
rospective survey of this type, which may have contributed to an overestimation of the association of tick bites with Q fever. Discussion. Recently, the possible importance of Q fever in US military personnel serving in Iraq has been reported, including a potential link with severe acute pneumonia [4, 5] . Of note, a patient with a nonfatal case of acute eosinophilic pneumonia requiring ventilation in the month before the outbreak was from the same 38-man platoon affected by this outbreak. That individual has since recovered and has no serologic evidence of infection with Coxiella burnetii.
This outbreak highlights the fact that Q fever is capable of causing localized outbreaks in exposed military personnel, with attack rates up to 50% and perhaps higher. Such outbreaks may have operational significance if a large exposure occurs, because the illness is debilitating for several days, and personnel are not fit for full duty while sick. It is possible that similar or smaller outbreaks of febrile disease in other units have escaped the notice of medical personnel or were not investigated because of lack of surveillance, vigilance, and/or resources. Further study of the seroconversion rates of the local Iraqi population and US personnel serving in Iraq is warranted, and such efforts are under way.
Risk factors identified in this outbreak were tick bites and, possibly, exposure to camels and the births of sheep and dogs. A likely scenario for this outbreak is that, while on patrol, the platoon on at least 1 occasion stopped or sought shelter in an area that was heavily infected because of recent animal inhabitation, birthing, or ticks. Unfortunately, we were unable to ask about specific patrol routes or temporary shelters, so we were unable to evaluate this hypothesis. However, compliance with current Department of Defense guidance about the use of personal protective measures (e.g., DEET on exposed skin and permethrin-treated uniforms) and minimizing exposure to both domestic and wild animals should minimize risk to deployed military personnel. Additionally, if alternatives are available and operational requirements permit, military personnel should avoid temporary occupancy of barns or structures in which animals have been living.
Finally, this outbreak investigation highlights the importance of maintaining both a robust microbiology capability where large numbers of military personnel are operating and collaboration between field public health units and regional reference laboratories.
